Wide-ranging harms of the ‘War on Drugs’ in the Philippines
World Day Against the Death Penalty
On World Day Against the Death Penalty, we are releasing the first of six briefs designed to provide policy advice to combat attempts to reintroduce the death penalty in the Philippines. These briefs were written by Eleos Justice at Monash University and Dr Imelda Deinla, in collaboration with the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHR), Capital Punishment Justice Project and the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty. Funding was provided by the European Union via the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
Rodrigo Duterte’s campaign to eradicate illicit drugs has had wide-ranging impacts on the Filipino people, communities and institutions, that may take many years to reverse.[1]
Extrajudicial killings
Duterte’s tenure as mayor of Davao City was characterised by widespread extrajudicial violence as an illicit drug-control measure. This became the cornerstone of Duterte’s 2016 presidential election campaign: ‘If I make it to the presidential palace I will do just what I did as mayor. You drug pushers, holdup men, and do-nothings, you better get out because I’ll kill you.’ Indeed, the ‘war on drugs’[2] became the centrepiece of Duterte’s presidency, throughout which he continued deadly rhetoric. In 2020, he ordered that ‘if it’s drugs, you shoot to kill’. Such pronouncements inspired widespread violence against persons suspected of involvement in drug use or dealing—presumably including cases of mistaken identity. Such violence was perpetrated by police and civilians alike, resulting in the killing of an estimated 12,000 to 30,000 individuals from 2016 to 2019.[3] The International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating into whether killings committed between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019 amounted to crimes against humanity.[4]
Mass incarceration, diseases and deaths
The crackdown on illicit drugs also resulted in the incarceration of many, the majority of whom were users and low-level dealers. In the first two years of the ‘war on drugs’, the prison population increased by 67% (one facility in Manila grew by 3,600%), putting increased pressure on an already overcrowded system. Cells designed for 10 people were being shared by 50-100 inmates, overstretched food budgets led to malnutrition, and increased overcrowding hastened transmission of diseases such as tuberculosis. At least 5,200 inmates died per year at the New Bilibid Prison under Duterte.
Breakdown of the Rule of Law
A key component of the ‘war on drugs’ was to rid all drug-affected barangays [‘districts’] of drugs by conducting house-to-house visits of people included on a ‘drug watch list’ compiled by officials. These ‘house visits’ raised due process concerns. Although Philippine legislation prohibits search or arrest without warrants, the operations allowed warrantless searches based solely on a person’s inclusion in the list. There was no legal recourse for challenging inclusion in the watch list, and refusing a visit could result in being charged or killed. Abuses during visits, including pressuring people to make confessions without counsel, or killing a person brought into custody, were rarely investigated.
Duterte repeatedly declared that he would not allow police officers involved in the killings to go to prison, and that he would promote them, contributing to a culture of impunity. Families of victims, lawyers, and journalists faced obstacles in documenting and pursuing cases including harassment and threats, lack of protection of witnesses, and unwillingness by law enforcement agencies to investigate.
Weakening of state institutions
Police officers reportedly received financial and professional incentives to kill, with quotas for arrests and kills to measure the performance of police officers.[5] The two significant branches of the government that could have served as a check against abuses were also weakened. Duterte gained a ‘supermajority’ in both the House of Representatives and Senate. This allowed Duterte to advance his legislative agenda, as demonstrated by the swift passage of the death penalty bill at the House of Representatives. He targeted critics of the war on drugs such as Senator Leila De Lima, who was removed from her post by his Senate allies and detained on allegations of corruption. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno was dismissed from her post by 8 out of 14 Supreme Court Justices even though the Constitution allows the removal of Supreme Court Justices only through impeachment by Congress.
Discrediting independent institutions
Duterte demonized human rights groups that condemned the war on drugs, calling on the police to shoot human rights workers for ‘obstructing justice’ and prohibiting police and military from cooperating with United Nations investigators. The House of Representatives attempted to dissolve the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines by allocating to it a budget of only PhP 1,000.00, but the move was met with public backlash. The Congress also shut down the largest broadcast network ABS-CBN following Duterte’s claims of biased reporting against him. The government revoked the licence of prominent news website Rappler, and its founder, Maria Ressa, faced numerous court cases and was arrested and detained multiple times. Journalists reporting on the war on drugs were subjected to death threats—at least 23 journalists were killed under Duterte’s administration.
Fracturing of community solidarity and the ‘Bayanihan’ Sprit
A hallmark of Filipino culture is the community spirit known as Bayanihan, a tradition built on mutual assistance where the entire community unites to help those in need. The climate of fear brought about by the war on drugs resulted in the fracturing of this community spirit. The drug watch lists, reportedly based mostly on rumors and suspicion, saw neighbors turning against each other. Whereas communities used to come together to assist families who lost their loved ones, only a few courageous individuals attended wakes and funerals of extra-judicial killing (EJK) victims while many resented or feared being associated with them. Diverging views on the righteousness of the ‘war on drugs’ created rifts between families and communities, with some ‘unfriending’ each other on social media as the exchanges became toxic. Massive disinformation was disseminated through Facebook—which is used by about 97% of Filipinos – fueled these rifts.
Lingering trauma and financial hardships of victims’ families
Families of EJK victims reportedly experienced lingering psychological trauma not only because of the deaths but because of the difficulties they experienced afterwards. Claiming the body of people killed by the police involved negotiating prices, and with delays, increased expenses for formaldehyde used to slow decomposition. Most could not afford proper funerals; funeral homes either refused to hold wakes for EJK victims or demanded steep price; and some social services withheld assistance for families of those killed in relation to the war on drugs.[6] Almost all EJK victims were male breadwinners of families, plunging them further into poverty. Many children were especially impacted, experiencing severe trauma for losing a parent or witnessing a killing, and facing deeper poverty.
Revival of calls for capital punishment: legitimising State-killing and disrespect for international law
As part of his ‘war on drugs’ campaign, Duterte called for the reintroduction of capital punishment for drug offenses, which would have provided another pathway for the State to kill alleged drug offenders. None of the Bills successfully passed into law; however, the efforts to reintroduce the death penalty risked legitimising the killing of alleged drug offenders by way of ‘judicial’ executions. In addition, the attempts to reintroduce the death penalty demonstrated troubling disrespect to the government’s domestic and international legal obligations to remain a death penalty abolitionist.
Creation of a lucrative black market
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime—the very agency responsible for enforcing global prohibition of illicit drugs—in 2015 acknowledged that international drug policy based on criminal punishment has created a ‘lucrative and violent black market’. Crackdowns on drug markets inevitably drive out risk-averse dealers, and draw in replacements with larger ones tolerant of risk and greater appetites for violence. And those crackdowns that are successful in reducing the availability of illicit drugs may simply drive up prices, given the inelasticity of demand for illicit drugs, especially when they are addictive. It is widely accepted among drug policy experts that the global war on illicit drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world. Such practice measures the ‘success’ of enforcement, such as the number of arrests, the amounts seized, or the harshness of punishments; these measures ‘may tell us how tough we are being, but they do not tell us how successful we are in improving the “health and welfare of mankind”’.
[1] This brief summarises key findings from: Ryan Beckmand (2022) ‘Rodrigo Duterte’s War on Drugs: Assessment of Consequential Harm Beyond the Death Toll’ LLM thesis submitted to Monash University (unpublished).
[2] A revival of Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric, this punitive campaign was characterised by a lack of regard for human rights and the rule of law.
[3] Many of the killings were committed by state actors during official police operations, although similar crimes were reportedly committed by so-called ‘vigilantes’ suspected to be working with police officers.
[4] In September 2021, the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorised an investigation into whether killings committed between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019 amounted to crimes against humanity. In November that same year, the Philippines challenged the authority of the ICC to investigate the matter, on the ground that the country had withdrawn from its jurisdiction in March 2019. In January 2023, the ICC declared that it retains jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed before the withdrawal took effect, and resumed its investigation accordingly.
[5] Ryan Beckmand (2022) ‘Rodrigo Duterte’s War on Drugs: Assessment of Consequential Harm Beyond the Death Toll’ LLM thesis submitted to Monash University (unpublished).
[6] Ibid.